India's implementation deficit
Indrani Bagchi
The Kaladan multi-modal transit-transport system connecting India’s north-eastern states through Myanmar to its Sittwe port was intended to be a landmark project that would power India’s links to Asean region. Signed in 2008, the project was supposed to be completed by 2013. But it’s unlikely to get anywhere for at least another few years largely because the Indian government estimates of the entire project was wildly inaccurate.
The project first envisaged 225 km of waterway on the river Kaladan, but this was later found to be incorrect, it has now been modified to 158 km. The road between Paletwa and Indo-Myanmar border was first thought to be 62 km, also incorrect, later corrected to 110 km. Nobody counted the shoals that had to be dredged in the river – there are 6 shoals, which if detected at the time the project was prepared could have altered the project. The cost, starting out at Rs 535 crore in 2008, now needs a massive Rs 2904 crore just to make amends for the mess. Not to speak of the impact on bilateral relations with Myanmar or even India’s larger strategic outreach to the rest of Asia.
Over the last decade, as India has moved to becoming a more active international player, Indian foreign policy has been hobbled by New Delhi’s inability to deliver on its promises, or follow up to see initiatives through. It means years later, subsequent governments have to jump through hoops just to maintain credibility. While the Modi government is working on laundry lists of achievements, it might be better to of Modi, it be more instructive to judge themselves on things they get done, rather than things they start, and leave to others to make up for their delays.
The Chahbahar port and connectivity project, for instance, has been a talking point for well over a decade. The first trilateral agreement between India, Iran and Afghanistan was signed in 2003, Manmohan Singh signed another trilateral MOU in 2012. The first framework agreement however only happened when Nitin Gadkari traveled to Iran in 2015 and PM Modi signed the final deal on Monday, to build and operate the port. India built the Zaranj-Delaram highway by 2009, but connecting to the port remained undone. So India’s great dream of connecting to Central Asia through Iran is still in progress.
In September 2013, India and US signed the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI), brainchild of Ash Carter and Shivshankar Menon, through which US would be building defense equipment in India. The first meeting was held only in September 2014. DRDO, the nodal agency was hopelessly ill-equipped to handle this initiative so it ran cold. Three years later, control of this projected has moved, giving India and US a chance to perhaps manufacture jet engines here. Basically, it means the gap between what we say and what we do is the India credibility gap.
The biggest example has been nuclear liability. Having secured a historic waiver for nuclear commerce by NSG in 2008, India scored a self-goal with an ill-designed liability law in 2010. Justified on moral grounds, it froze out foreign nuclear players leading the US to take the grouse to other aspects of the relationship. It also stopped nuclear supplies by Indian companies to domestic power plants. Five years later, India had to work out a new understanding with the US, complete administration arrangements (all hanging fire) reassure nuclear companies, ratify CSC after creating an insurance pool, getting NPCIL to buy cover etc. Indian companies are considering bidding as nuclear suppliers after almost 6 years.
India has messed up Nepal in more ways than one. We can think of many, but just look at this -- we were supposed to build roads in the Terai to ease connectivity, prove we are as good as the Chinese. Years later, it turns out land availability was not checked, of the six phases, only one has been completed, the contractor has actually abandoned the work. This government then went ahead and blockaded Nepal – New Delhi worries about growing anti-India pro-China sentiment in Nepal. Wonder why?
India was one of Mahinda Rajapakse’s earliest supporters, specially when he took the war to the LTTE and won. Somehow, Rajapakse was allowed to slip out of our sphere of influence and by 2013 India was staring at a security nightmare of the Colombo Port City project financed by China. India is the largest user of the Colombo Port. The new president, Maithripala Sirisena, also supported by India, is confronting an $8 billion debt, so can do nothing but stay with the Chinese and their usurious rates. He wants India to fix it, but short of paying their debt, India now can only do “damage control.”
China is not the only opposition to India in the global non-proliferation regimes. Enter Italy. As a result of the Indian decision to arrest two Italian Marines for mistaking Kerala fishermen to be Somalian pirates, and letting the case sit around without resolution, Italy has gone out of its way to ensure there were no India-EU summits after 2013, the first being March 2016; blocked India’s membership to the MTCR at the last moment, and is opposing India in the NSG as well. Much diplomatic capital has to be expended by this government including the international arbitration to give everybody an honourable exit.
Indians will find ways to blame others for mess-ups. Or blame the lack of numbers in MEA. Maybe foreign policy practice should involve game theory. Or, Indian governments could concentrate on just getting things done. That could work.
May 25, 2016. The Times of India
End
The Kaladan multi-modal transit-transport system connecting India’s north-eastern states through Myanmar to its Sittwe port was intended to be a landmark project that would power India’s links to Asean region. Signed in 2008, the project was supposed to be completed by 2013. But it’s unlikely to get anywhere for at least another few years largely because the Indian government estimates of the entire project was wildly inaccurate.
The project first envisaged 225 km of waterway on the river Kaladan, but this was later found to be incorrect, it has now been modified to 158 km. The road between Paletwa and Indo-Myanmar border was first thought to be 62 km, also incorrect, later corrected to 110 km. Nobody counted the shoals that had to be dredged in the river – there are 6 shoals, which if detected at the time the project was prepared could have altered the project. The cost, starting out at Rs 535 crore in 2008, now needs a massive Rs 2904 crore just to make amends for the mess. Not to speak of the impact on bilateral relations with Myanmar or even India’s larger strategic outreach to the rest of Asia.
Over the last decade, as India has moved to becoming a more active international player, Indian foreign policy has been hobbled by New Delhi’s inability to deliver on its promises, or follow up to see initiatives through. It means years later, subsequent governments have to jump through hoops just to maintain credibility. While the Modi government is working on laundry lists of achievements, it might be better to of Modi, it be more instructive to judge themselves on things they get done, rather than things they start, and leave to others to make up for their delays.
The Chahbahar port and connectivity project, for instance, has been a talking point for well over a decade. The first trilateral agreement between India, Iran and Afghanistan was signed in 2003, Manmohan Singh signed another trilateral MOU in 2012. The first framework agreement however only happened when Nitin Gadkari traveled to Iran in 2015 and PM Modi signed the final deal on Monday, to build and operate the port. India built the Zaranj-Delaram highway by 2009, but connecting to the port remained undone. So India’s great dream of connecting to Central Asia through Iran is still in progress.
In September 2013, India and US signed the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI), brainchild of Ash Carter and Shivshankar Menon, through which US would be building defense equipment in India. The first meeting was held only in September 2014. DRDO, the nodal agency was hopelessly ill-equipped to handle this initiative so it ran cold. Three years later, control of this projected has moved, giving India and US a chance to perhaps manufacture jet engines here. Basically, it means the gap between what we say and what we do is the India credibility gap.
The biggest example has been nuclear liability. Having secured a historic waiver for nuclear commerce by NSG in 2008, India scored a self-goal with an ill-designed liability law in 2010. Justified on moral grounds, it froze out foreign nuclear players leading the US to take the grouse to other aspects of the relationship. It also stopped nuclear supplies by Indian companies to domestic power plants. Five years later, India had to work out a new understanding with the US, complete administration arrangements (all hanging fire) reassure nuclear companies, ratify CSC after creating an insurance pool, getting NPCIL to buy cover etc. Indian companies are considering bidding as nuclear suppliers after almost 6 years.
India has messed up Nepal in more ways than one. We can think of many, but just look at this -- we were supposed to build roads in the Terai to ease connectivity, prove we are as good as the Chinese. Years later, it turns out land availability was not checked, of the six phases, only one has been completed, the contractor has actually abandoned the work. This government then went ahead and blockaded Nepal – New Delhi worries about growing anti-India pro-China sentiment in Nepal. Wonder why?
India was one of Mahinda Rajapakse’s earliest supporters, specially when he took the war to the LTTE and won. Somehow, Rajapakse was allowed to slip out of our sphere of influence and by 2013 India was staring at a security nightmare of the Colombo Port City project financed by China. India is the largest user of the Colombo Port. The new president, Maithripala Sirisena, also supported by India, is confronting an $8 billion debt, so can do nothing but stay with the Chinese and their usurious rates. He wants India to fix it, but short of paying their debt, India now can only do “damage control.”
China is not the only opposition to India in the global non-proliferation regimes. Enter Italy. As a result of the Indian decision to arrest two Italian Marines for mistaking Kerala fishermen to be Somalian pirates, and letting the case sit around without resolution, Italy has gone out of its way to ensure there were no India-EU summits after 2013, the first being March 2016; blocked India’s membership to the MTCR at the last moment, and is opposing India in the NSG as well. Much diplomatic capital has to be expended by this government including the international arbitration to give everybody an honourable exit.
Indians will find ways to blame others for mess-ups. Or blame the lack of numbers in MEA. Maybe foreign policy practice should involve game theory. Or, Indian governments could concentrate on just getting things done. That could work.
May 25, 2016. The Times of India
End
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